La gouvernance des entreprises marocaines cotées en bourse : compréhension des défis et intégration des aspects comportementaux

Abstract

Summary:

This article aims to demonstrate the importance of behavioral approaches in developing a governance theory that addresses the shortcomings of classical theory. It highlights the limitations of the latter, as evidenced by the low explanatory levels observed in some studies, such as Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2004), which show that this approach explains only 9.1% of firms performance in the American context. Researchers like Jensen (2004) also question the effectiveness of traditional disciplinary mechanisms, such as financial markets, in the face of the behavioral biases of economic actors. An alternative explored, notably by Charreaux (2002 ,2003), consists of adopting a more complete approach to governance, considered conflicts between parties involved and the important role of skills in value creation.

Jensen extracts insights from research conducted in various fields such as neuroscience, organizational learning, and behavioral economics, particularly the works of Thaler and Shefrin (1981). He identifies behavioral biases as a source of "self-agency costs," but these consequences remain underexplored in his work on corporate governance.

Thus, this article proposes to explore the implications of behavioral biases in governance theory, by revisiting their definition and role in the literature and then proposing a method to incorporate these elements into governance theory.

Keywords:  governance, behavioral bias, firm performance, crises, financial scandal, agency theory, behavioral theory, governance mechanisms, board of directors, listed companies Casablanca Stock Exchange.